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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been reported that two months before the 2003 Iraq War commenced, President George W. Bush did not understand the distinction between the Sunni and Shīʿī sects of Islam.1 Paul Bremer, the top civilian
administrator in Iraq shortly after the invasion,2 did not initially grasp the
revered position held by Ayatollah Sistani—effectively the most powerful person in the country.3 This was even the case after Sistani issued a
religious decree requiring that Iraq’s constitution could only be drafted
by representatives picked through a general election.4 Reflecting on this
roadblock to Bremer’s plans, who had handpicked the Iraqi Governing

1. Diane E. Dees, Sunnis and Shiites and Muslims, oh my!, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 4, 2006),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/08/sunnis-and-shiites-and-muslims-oh-my/.
Upon
learning about the distinction in the context of Iraq, he reportedly exclaimed, “I thought the Iraqis
were Muslims!” Id.
2. As the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Bremer had the authority to rule by
decree. Among his notable decrees (and his first two orders of business) were the banning of the
Baʿath party and disbanding of the Iraqi Army. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1: DeBa’athification of Iraqi Society of 2003 (Iraq), https://www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf [hereinafter Iraq Authority Order 1];
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities (Aug. 23, 2003),
https://www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.
3. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY 90–91 (2006). Condoleezza
Rice, the former U.S. Secretary of State, for whom I worked as a research assistant in connection
with her 2011 autobiography, No Higher Honor, told me during one of our discussions that Ayatollah Sistani was often viewed as a mystery to the Bush administration.
4. Chandrasekaran, supra note 3, at 93. He is also “credited with insisting on the incorporation of Islamic law into the Constitution.” Intisar A. Rabb, ‘We the Jurists’: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527 (2008).
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Council for purposes of drafting a constitution, one former Bremer aide
reflected on the U.S.’s severe lack of understanding of Iraq’s political and
religious dynamics. “The view was, ‘We’ll just get someone to write another fatwa.’”5 The distinctive character of Shīʿī legal theory, which relies
heavily on the transnational and transregional power of clerical authority
(i.e., the institution of the marjaʿīya),6 can be difficult to understand in
the modern world.7 The marājeʿ are a small group of Shīʿī jurists whose
rulings are considered religiously binding for observant Shīʿa. The exceptionally hierarchical nature of their power, which often seemingly operates coterminously with, if not outside of, the bounds of the state, provides scholars of law and statehood a unique opportunity to examine the
evolution of a pre-modern tradition within a contemporary context.
In this Article, I will explore the interaction between Shīʿī jurists
and the state in Iraq and Lebanon, two countries with majority-Shīʿī populations. The dynamic and sometimes fraught relationship between Shīʿī
jurists and the state has important implications for legal and political institutions in the broader Middle East. Despite the fact that both Iraq and
Lebanon have democratic institutions, jurists wield enormous power in
domestic governance and international policy. Legislators often seek
their perspectives and blessings before promulgating major decisions, or
as a means of bolstering their own political support.
For all their power, however, jurists are not educated in statecraft.
The religious credentials required to become a marjaʿ consist largely of
a traditional training in classical jurisprudence. Iran, a Shīʿī-majority
country where the clergy maintains political power, is a notable exception, and will not be a subject of my analysis. There are two reasons for
this: (1) the political dynamics of the country have created a unique relationship between Shīʿī law and the state that is not found in other places,
5. Chandrasekaran, supra note 3, at 91. The shift in the understanding of Sistani’s important
role in Iraq among U.S. policymakers is evidenced by former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tweet regarding Sistani’s surgery: “My prayers are extended along with the millions of Iraqis
to whom he is a source of guidance and inspiration. May God grant him a speedy recovery and long
life.” Mike Pompeo (@SecPompeo), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2020, 5:55 PM), https://www.twitter.com
/SecPompeo/status/1217988702133280768.
6. The literal translation of this word is “source” or “reference.” In the context of Shīʿī law,
the term marjaʿ is used to refer to a source of religious authority (i.e., a learned scholar) who is
followed by others.
7. In the Iranian context, the fatwa of one ayatollah forced the collapse of the British cigarette
industry overnight. Reese Erlich, Iran is Losing its Jihad on Tobacco, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 29,
2018), https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/29/iran-is-losing-its-jihad-on-tobacco/. In the Iraqi
context, the 1920 Revolution in the country was inspired in part by the encouragement of ayatollahs. For example, Ayatollah Shirazi issued an edict declaring that “none but Muslims have any
right to rule over Muslims.” Lawrence E. Cline, The Prospects of the Shia Insurgency Movement
in Iraq, 20 J. CONFLICT STUD. 2 (2000).

FINAL_TO_JCI

252

7/7/22 10:08 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 45.4

and thus any comparison would yield limited insights; (2) there is already
a rich body of secondary scholarship on the Iranian religio-legal system,
whereas the scholarship on Shīʿī legal authority elsewhere is more limited.
In order to frame my analysis, I will examine the fatāwa, or religious
edicts, of marājeʿ pertaining to the institution of mutʿa, usually translated
as “temporary marriage” in the West.8 By focusing on a widely (religiously) accepted and highly controversial feature of Shīʿī jurisprudence,
and locating and analyzing legal rulings against the backdrop of relevant
moral, political, and legal discourses and developments taking place
across two Shīʿī-majority countries, I hope to demonstrate the complex
relationship between classically-trained jurists and contemporary geopolitical developments. In particular, this Article will examine the work of
(1) Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq, an erudite scholar with a prolific scholarly
output who commands tens of millions of followers and retains enormous
religious and political capital, and (2) Ayatollah Fadlallah of Lebanon, a
key figure and innovative thinker in the country’s spiritual and political
life until his death in 2010. My intervention here will be to compare and
contrast the delicate balance kept by these jurists in managing multiple
competing priorities, including abiding by their religious beliefs, appeasing their political constituencies, and navigating pressures from the state.
It is my hope that my analysis of their fatāwā, along with my explanation
of the political, social, and legal forces driving changes in Shīʿī law and
legal theory, will enhance the field’s understanding of Shīʿism and law in
the Middle East.
In Part II, I will provide a brief overview of the institution of the
marjaʿīa and situate it within the context of contemporary geopolitics. In
Part III and Part IV, I will examine the legal and juristic background of
Iraq and Lebanon respectively. This will include (1) an overview of jurists’ involvement with the countries’ legal systems since the 20th century,
(2) details regarding legislation pertaining to family law, and (3) juristic
rulings relating to temporary marriage. My analysis in Part III and Part
IV will be based on a review of both Arabic legislative materials and legal
manuals (i.e., collections of religious edicts, or fatāwa).

8. Although the term mutʿa is colloquially used in English to refer to temporary marriage,
the phrase Zawj al-muʿaqqat, which is found in Arabic fiqh discourses, more accurately describes
the concept of temporary marriage. As for mutʿa, for which the correct Arabic technical term is
nikāh al-mutʿa, a more accurate English rendering is “pleasure marriage.” In Persian and Urdu, it
is referred to as sīgheh and sīghah respectively.
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II. BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND QUIETISM
In the modern age, the Shīʿī legal tradition has veered in dramatic
fashion between political quietism and activism, almost always in direct
response to contemporary geopolitical developments.9 The ambiguous
role of the mujtahid in political matters is a matter of doctrinal debate and
contention within Shīʿī circles. Ayatollah Khomeini envisioned the role
of a mujtahid as akin to a philosopher-king. In Lebanon, clerics have been
active participants in the political system since the 1970s. In Iraq, clerics
stayed away from politics completely during the Saddam era. The Najaf
school has become a potent force in national and regional politics in recent years, although it has traditionally and self-consciously cultivated an
image of aloofness from politics.10 Recent scholarship has convincingly
challenged the notion that Iraqi clerics continue to remain quietist, a belief harbored especially by many believers outside of Iraq. This scholarship instead argues that Shīʿī clerical authority is a highly complex institution for which there are “multiple claimants and potentially centers of
power.”11
These “centers of power” refer to a handful of clerics that govern
many aspects of the lives of hundreds of millions of people. Under Shīʿī
legal theory, a believer is required to follow a marjaʿ al-taqlīd,12 a status
only achieved by a select few legal scholars (often referred to as

9. In his article on Shīʿī clerical authority, Robert Gleave provides an excellent summary of
the dominant religio-political trends among 20th and 21st century ulema in Iraq, ranging from activism (including marājeʿ involved in anti-communist and anti-baʿth activities) to quietism (a hallmark of the hawza in the two decades before Saddam Hussein’s downfall). Robert Gleave, Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism: Baqir al-Hakim, Ha’iri and Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and
Marja’iyya, 20 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 2 (2007).
10. For example, in 2003, the Los Angeles Times asked Sistani several questions, the exchange for one of which I have translated here:
Q: Do you believe that the honorable hawza needs to have a bigger role in Iraqi political life, and
especially under the current circumstances?
A: The primary role of the hawza is education, guidance, and religious cultivation, but that does
not prohibit religious authorities from expressing their opinions regarding important junctures in
people’s lives, like the preparation of a permanent constitution for the country.
Press Release, As-ila sahīfa Los Angeles Times (Oct. 27, 2003) https://www.sistani.org/arabic/archive/236/.
11. Sajjad Rizvi, The Making of a Marja’: Sīstānī and Shi’i Religious Authority in the Contemporary Age, 6 SOCIO. OF ISLAM 168 (2018). Rizvi further argues that the institution of the
marjaʿīya has adapted such that it has not been at all marginalized. Rizvi focuses on Ayatollah
Sistani, noting that he has been successful due to the efficiency of his organization, his excellent
transnational network, and the multiple financial sources that allow the institution to thrive.
12. Gleave, supra note 9, at 70.
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ayatollahs or marājeʿ), or to become a mujtahid13 oneself (highly impractical for the majority of the population). This widely agreed upon requirement within the Shīʿī belief system means that marājeʿ wield immense
authority over the day-to-day lives of believers, ranging in matters from
the method of prayer to the conduct of business. Such power can be contentious at times, especially when it interferes with the power of the state
to govern its citizens,14 and also extends beyond the confines of a mujtahid’s country of residence.15 It is quite common, for example, for Shīʿī
communities in Pakistan, India, and the West to closely follow the legal
rulings issued by jurists in Najaf and Qom.16
The importance of Najaf as a center of Shīʿī legal authority cannot
be overstated.17 The city grew in prominence because it is the burial site
of the first Shīʿī Imam, and virtually all prominent Shīʿī clerics of the
modern age have sought training there, including Ayatollah Khomeini.18
13. Literally, one who is qualified to perform ijtihād. The term has taken on a technical meaning within the Shīʿī context so that only a person who has completed certain training and is recognized by others to have achieved a certain level of knowledge, can claim to be a mujtahid.
14. Under Saddam Hussein, the Shīʿī ulema were repressed to an extreme level in order to
ensure loyalty to the Iraqi state. But even under the leadership of former Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki, a Shīʿī, there was conflict. See Ali Mamouri, Ayatollah Sistani for Nobel Peace Prize?, ALMONITOR (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/03/sistani-campaign-nobel-peace-prize.html (reporting the Prime Minister’s “rejection of what he called the ‘interference
of some foreign religious references. . . Despite our respect for them, this is unacceptable’”). See
also, e.g., the fact that the Shīʿī community resisted paying state-mandated zakāt in Pakistan, a
decision that spawned the creation of a violent Sunni organization that carried out dozens of attacks
on the Shīʿa in the following decades. Syed Shoaib Hasan, Divided we fall, DAWN (Nov. 2, 2012),
https://www.dawn.com/news/760952/divided-we-fall.
15. Linda Darwish, Texts of Tension, Spaces of Empowerment: Migrant Muslims and the
Limits of Shi’ite Legal Discourse (2009) (Ph.D. thesis, Concordia University), https://www.spectrum.library.concordia.ca/976418/1/NR63456.pdf. Linda Darwish’s Ph.D. dissertation details
modern print and online fatāwa geared toward Western audiences.
16. Linda Darwish concludes that significant tensions exist between Western Shīʿī communities, who are increasingly assimilating into Western culture, and the marājeʿ, whose rulings aim to
compel followers to replicate non-Western environments. Id. Liyakat Takim argues that fatāwa
issued by Shīʿī religious scholars based in Iraq and Iran intended for Western Muslims “are casuistic in nature and do not represent a full-fledged legal system.” Liyakat Takim, Marja’iyya and the
Juristic Challenges of the Diaspora 2 AUSTL. J. ISLAMIC STUD. 40 (2017). He also notes that these
collections tend to differ from traditional collections of edicts, which do not focus on the types of
issues found in fiqh al-aqalʿīyya manuals (e.g., inter-gender handshaking, which Takim discusses
extensively). Based on the nature of these collections, Takim argues that Shīʿī religious authorities
are unaware of, and disconnected from, the issues facing Western Muslims.
17. The influence of Najaf is starting to be understood even outside of Shīʿī circles. In March
of 2021, Pope Francis visited Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf. Jason Horowitz & Jane Arraf, Pope Francis Meets Iraq’s Top Ayatollah as Both Urge Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/world/europe/pope-francis-iraq-ayatollah-sistani.html.
18. See generally Ali Mamouri, Students at Qom seminary are leaving for Najaf, ALMONITOR (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2018/10/iran-qom-howza-iraqnajaf-ali-khomeini.html (noting that “Ayatollah Khomeini lived in Najaf for nearly 15 years, where
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This includes Ayatollah Sistani, a native Iranian who resettled in Najaf in
the 1950s,19 and commands the following of the vast majority of the
world’s Shīʿa, especially those residing outside of Iran.20 In Lebanon,
Ayatollah Fadlallah, often called the “spiritual leader”21 of Hezbollah,
commanded a large following prior to his passing in 2010, and his rulings
continue to be followed by many today.22
III. IRAQ
A. Legal and Juristic Background of Iraq
The history of juristic involvement in Iraq has undergone tremendous change over the past century. The 1920 Iraqi Revolution, which was
inspired in part by clerical encouragement,23 was crushed in horrific fashion by the British government.24 After staying out of mainstream politics
for approximately 20-30 years, the ulema once again reemerged as a political force in the 1950s, in large part as a response to communism, which
was capturing large segments of the population (including many from

he focused on religious and political activities, taught and wrote religious books, and led the Islamic
revolution in Iran”).
19. Abbas Kadhim, Forging a third way: Sistani’s marja’iyya between quietism and wilāyat
al-faqīh, in IRAQ, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD 66, 67 (Ali Paya & John
L. Esposito eds., 2010).
20. See generally id. at 67–68 (describing Sistani’s prominence in Najaf, Iraq).
21. Nada Husseini, Hezbollah’s spiritual leader in critical condition, CNN (July 2, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/07/02/lebanon.grand.ayatollah/index.html; Lee Smith,
Iran and Hezbollah’s Spiritual Leader, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 7, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704862404575350951440367406.
22. Talib Aziz, Fadlallah and the Remaking of the Marja ‘iya, in THE MOST LEARNED OF
THE SHI’A: THE INSTITUTION OF THE MARJ’A TAQLID 208 (Linda S. Walbridge ed. 2001) (Despite
his popularity, Fadlallah was never unanimously accepted among senior Shīʿī clerics as a marjaʿ
al-taqlīd.).
23. Amal Vinogradov, The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered, 3 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST
STUDIES 135–36 (1972) (Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi issued a fatwa stating that “None but
Moslems have any right to rule over Moslems.”).
24. Marek Pruszewicz, The 1920s British air bombing campaign in Iraq, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29441383. After the revolution, the British were
wary of any Shiite leadership emerging as a threat to British rule. So afraid were the British of the
influence of the ulema that Gertrude Bell, a British colonial administrator, once wrote that “final
authority must be in the hands of the Sunnis, in spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you
will have a mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil.” ABBAS KADHIM, RECLAIMING
IRAQ: THE 1920 REVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE MODERN STATE 149 (2012). As a result,
“between 1918 and 1957, the number of students in the Najaf hawza fell from 6000 to less than
2000.” Rodger Shanahan, Shiʿa Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Daʿwa
Party, 25 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 944 (2004). Thus, the period between 1920-1950 was one of
marked political quietism from the religious leadership in Iraq.
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clerical families) and was viewed as an existential threat to Islam.25 When
the Communist Party acquired prominence in 1958, one well-known
cleric embarrassed the administration by issuing a fatwa associating communism with atheism, and forbidding people from joining the Communist Party.26 Political activity witnessed a marked increase until the
early 1980s, although always conducted clandestinely, and often resulting in brutal force being applied against activists.27 In the two decades
before the U.S. invasion, the hawza, or Shīʿī seminary, turned to quietism
in order to mitigate abuse by the Baʿath regime.28 In the last 18 years,
however, Shīʿī religious authorities have been highly involved with shaping the political culture and makeup of the country. Although Sistani has
no official political designation, he periodically issues fatwas expressing
his viewpoints, including crucial fatwas in 2003,29 2009,30 2013,31 2014,32
25. Keiko Sakai, Modernity and Tradition in the Islamic Movements in Iraq: Continuity and
Discontinuity in the Role of the Ulama, 23 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY 38 (2001). See also,
Iqtisādunā and Falsafatunā by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, monumental treatises on Islamic economics and Islamic philosophy by a major Shīʿī scholar that engage extensively in polemical discourse against the rising threat of Communism.
26. T.M. Aziz, The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from
1958 to 1980, 25 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 209 (1993).
27. Id. at 218 (Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, for example, a mujtahid of immense promise, was
executed by Saddam Hussein along with his sister).
28. Kadhim, supra note 19, at 73 (Kadhim argues that the quietism that did arise in the hawza
is not intrinsic to the institution of the marjaʿīya, but rather was a result of the hawza’s effort to
ensure its own survival. Kadhim claims that the fatāwa being issued by Ayatollah Sistani after the
U.S. Invasion of Iraq served a dual function as both religious edicts as well as political messages,
and provides evidence that such fatāwa were being read by the American occupation forces. More
broadly, Kadhim argues that Ayatollah Sistani’s expert handling of various political crises in the
post-2003 era has made him much more than the quietist that he is assumed to be).
29. Press Release, Response Regarding the Preparation for the Writing of the Iraqi Constitution, Istiftā’ hawla Mashrūʿ Kitābat al-Dastūr al-Iraqi (Jun. 21, 2003), https://www.sistani.org/arabic/archive/273/ (Sistani issued a religious decree disagreeing with the plan to have Iraq’s constitution drafted by an unelected governing council selected by Americans).
30. Press Release, Ahmad al-Safi, Status of Current Situation in Iraq, Bayān Maktab Sāmihat
al-Sayyid (Dām Zillahu) Hawla Intikhābāt Majālis al-Muhafizāt (Jan. 18, 2009), https://www.sistani.org/arabic/statement/1509/ (Sistani issued a statement encouraging citizens to vote).
31. Ali Mamouri, Sistani Issues Fatwa Against Sectarian Violence in Iraq, AL-MONITOR
(Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/10/iraqi-moderates-manage-sectarianism.html.
32. Press Release, Sheikh Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai, Second Sermon from the Holy Shrine of
al-Husayni al-Sharif, Mā Warada fī Khutbat al-Jumʿa li-Mumathil al-Marjaʿ al-Dīnīa al-ʿilyā fī
Karbala’ al-Muqaddisa al-Shaykh ʿAbd al-Mahdī al-Karbala’ī (Jun. 13, 2014), https://www.sistani.org/arabic/archive/24918/ (In 2014, in response to ISIS’s rise to power in Iraq, Sistani’s representative in Karbala delivered the following message in a Friday prayer sermon: “Citizens who are
able to carry weapons and fight terrorists in defense of their country, people, and their holy places,
it is [obligatory] on them to volunteer to join the security forces.”). Farnaz Fassihi, Ali A. Nabhan,
and Tamer El-Ghobashy, Thousands Heed Call to Arms in Iraq, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jun. 13,
2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqs-shiite-leaders-issue-call-to-arms-1402665085 (Sistani’s
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2018,33 and 202134 that have dramatically impacted political developments.
B. Mutʿa in Iraq: Legislation
As a matter of civil law, discussions regarding mutʿa are usually
subsumed within a wider discussion regarding Shīʿī family law. The Iraqi
Personal Status Law of 1959 governs family law in Iraq,35 a product of
the communist mood sweeping the country at the time.36 Among other
things, the promulgation of the law in 1959 meant that civil courts “replace[d] the Sunni and Ja’afari37 Sharia law courts.”38 Notably, mutʿa
marriage is not contemplated in the legislation, although Saddam Hussein

statement at the time heightened fears about the possibility of further sectarian bloodshed, although
this did not ultimately transpire. According to one contemporaneous news report, “Ayatollah Sistani’s call was quickly answered by thousands of gun-toting men, who emerged in Baghdad, Basra
and other Iraqi cities to declare their readiness to join a holy war. TV images showed young men
lining up behind pickup trucks and outside of military bases.”).
33. Press Release, Statement from the Office of His Eminence Al-Sayyid, Bayān Maktab
Sāmihat al-Sayyid (Dām Zillahu) Hawla al-Intikhābāt al-Nīyābīya (May 4, 2018), https://www.sistani.org/arabic/statement/26025/ (Sistani’s office released a statement prior to the 2018 parliamentary elections confirming that he still believes holding elections is the best way forward for Iraq.
“Today, after the passing of fifteen years from that date [i.e., since the date he first called for free
and fair elections in Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime], the marja’ [i.e., Sistani] continues to
believe that his opinion was the correct one (in principle) – considered the correct choice and appropriate until the present for the country and its future, and that it [i.e., free and fair elections] is
necessary to act as a bulwark against the occurrence of the perils of tyrannical rule and an authoritarian system under any pretext or title.”).
34. Press Release, Al-Sistani, Bayān Sādir min Maktab Sāmihat (Dām Zillahu) Hawla alLiqa’ih bi al-Habr al-aʿzam Bābā al-Fātīkān, (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.sistani.org/english/archive/26509/ (After a historic meeting between the Pope and Sistani in Najaf, Sistani’s office issued
a press release summarizing the meeting, in which Sistani reiterated the important role played by
religious figures in protecting minorities. He emphasized his interest in Christian citizens living
like all Iraqis in security and peace and with full constitutional rights. He pointed to the role that
religious authorities must perform in protecting them and others who suffered oppression and harm
in the events of the past years, especially during the period in which terrorists seized vast swathes
of territory in several Iraqi provinces, and they practiced criminal acts there.).
35. The Act to Amend the Amended Law (188) of the Year 1959; Personal Status Law, in
Iraq Kurdistan Region Act No. 15 of 2008, http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/personal_status_law.pdf
[hereinafter Iraq Act No. 15] (The Kurdish parliament has amended the Personal Status Law, and
thus is not subject to the text of the original legislation). The original amendment is in Kurdish. The
quotation is taken from an English-language translation provided as a link to the website of the
Kurdish Regional Government’s Representation in the United States.
36. Raghad Kasim, The Personal Status Law and Political Tensions in Iraq, 1001 IRAQI
THOUGHTS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.1001iraqithoughts.com/2019/02/14/the-personal-statuslaw-and-political-tensions-in-iraq/.
37. This is a term used to describe legal positions from a Shīʿī perspective. It is analogous to
the use of the terms Hanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Hanbalī.
38. Kasim, supra note 36, at 2.
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banned the practice.39 Religious ceremonies are not considered legally
sufficient to demonstrate marriage.
The Personal Status Law has faced numerous legislative challenges
to its authority over the years but has managed to survive. In 2003, the
Iraqi Governing Council issued “Decision Number 137,” which was designed to supersede the Personal Status Law in favor of Islamic rules that
would govern family law.40 Paul Bremer, a U.S. official appointed to
oversee the Iraqi Governing Council, vetoed the law.41
In 2014, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the Ja’afari Law, a
set of personal status laws designed to apply to Iraq’s Shīʿī citizens, 42
39. See Women’s Groups Blast “Temporary Marriages”, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN (Jan. 23,
2006),
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/26074/iraq-women%E2%80%99s-groupsblast-%E2%80%9Ctemporary%E2%80%9D-marriages. Many secondary sources mention that
mutʿa was banned under Saddam Hussein, although I was unable to find any primary source materials (e.g., legislation or court cases) confirming that the ban was formally promulgated.
40. See Ārā’ ukhra hawla Taʿdīlāt Aānun al-Ahwāl al-Shakhsīya, AL-BADĪL AL-ʿIRAQĪ,
https://www.web.archive.org/web/20190403062103/http://albadeeliraq.com:80/ar/node/775.
41. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1: De-Ba’thification of Iraqi Society of 2003
(Iraq),
https://www.govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_
Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf [hereinafter Iraq Authority Order 1] (Paul Bremer was appointed to oversee the formation of a democratic Iraq, with the idea being that he would usher the
country into a new era where laws were based on Western constitutional principles. Ironically,
Bremer held the power to refuse approval of decisions made by the Iraqi Governing Council).
NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND ETHICS OF NATION BUILDING 111 (2004)
(“Regulations and Orders issued by the Administrator shall take precedence over all other laws and
publications to the extent such other laws and publications are inconsistent.” He did exactly this
with Decision Number 137).
42. The draft legislation sparked widespread outrage, both within Iraq and among the international human rights community. For a spirited essay opposing the legislation, see, e.g., a widely
read article by Safia Al Souhail, a former Member of Parliament in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Safia Al Souhail (trans. Yomna Sarhan), Iraq’s New Personal Status Ja’fari Law is Sectarian
I, WILSON CENTER (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iraqis-new-personal-status-jafari-law-sectarian. For an example of concern by the international community, see, e.g., a
report written by Human Rights Watch. Iraq: Don’t Legalize Marriage for 9-Year-Olds, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/11/iraq-dont-legalize-marriage-9-year-olds. Even certain members of the religious establishment did not support the proposed legislation. NPR quotes Ayatollah Jawad al-Khalisi as saying the following in an interview:
“There are matters which were mentioned in that law that are really unnecessary for contemporary
generations . . . They pertain to old jurisprudence, so they shouldn’t be brought up now and pushed
on people.” Iraq Debates Law That Would Allow Men To Marry 9-Year-Old Girls, NPR (May 13,
2014),
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/05/13/312160466/iraq-debates-law-thatwould-allow-men-to-marry-9-year-old-girls. Sistani is also reported to have “objected over possible violations of minority and human rights.” Mamouri, supra note 14. This proposed legislation
does not appear to be publicly available. Haider Ala Hamoudi, a former advisor to the Constitutional Review Committee of the Iraqi Legislature, cites to the 2013 draft of the Jaʿfari Personal
Status Code in a law review article by noting that it is “on file with author.” He also notes that
“copies of the draft Code were widely disseminated throughout Iraq in the early part of 2014” and
provides a link to a copy that was available on the internet. However, it appears that this link is no
longer active since the author last accessed it on May 5, 2016. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Resurrecting
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including Article 63, which permitted temporary marriage.43 The Iraqi
parliament considered the law, although the law ultimately did not pass
through a final vote.44 In 2017, the Proposed Law to Amend the Personal
Status Law,45 which would have imposed requirements similar to the
2014 initiative,46 was “ratified in principle”47 by the Iraqi parliament in
October, but was subsequently rejected in December.48
As can be seen, there has been a concerted political effort to promulgate Shīʿī family law, including the tenets of temporary marriage, in
Iraq. Despite its illegality, the practice appears to take place unabated.49
Several media outlets and human rights organizations have reported on
the increasing prevalence of the practice, which appears to be driven in

Islam or Cementing Social Hierarchy?: Reexamining the Codification of “Islamic” Personal Status Law, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 338 (2016).
43. Haifa Zangana, Ja’fari law takes the Iraqi government’s violation of women’s rights to a
new level, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/14/jafari-law-iraqi-violation-women-rights-marital-rape.
44. Kasim, supra note 36, at 3.
45. Qānūn Taʿdīl Aānūn al-Ahwāl al-Shakhsīyya Raqam 188 li-Sana 1959, ARCHIVE OF THE
WEBSITE OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT OF THE THIRD ELECTORAL CYCLE 2014-2018 (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.arb.parliament.iq/archive/2017/09/14/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8
8%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%
D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%
A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8518/ (The text of the proposal is available on an archived section of the website of the Iraqi parliament).
46. Iraq: Parliament Rejects Marriage for 8-Year-Old Girls, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec.
17, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/17/iraq-parliament-rejects-marriage-8-year-oldgirls (“The proposed amendments instead would require the secular courts to apply religious law
on marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The amendments also recommend – but do not require –
establishing specialized Personal Status Courts, headed by religious judges, to adjudicate family
law issues.”).
47. Kasim, supra note 36.
48. Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 46. Note that I did not find evidence of such
consideration and rejection on the Iraqi Parliament’s website. The only reference to this matter is a
publication listing a planned agenda for October 30, 2017. The same publication notes that the
session did not take place. Jūdūl Aʿmāl al-Jalsa Raqam (29) al-Ithnayn 30 Tashrīn al-Awwal 2017,
WEBSITE OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.ar.parliament.iq/2017/10
/30/%d8%ac%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d8%af%d9%88%d
9%84-%d8%a7%d8%b9%d9%85%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80%d9%
80%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%80%d9%80%d9%80
%d9%80-12/.
49. Women’s Groups Blast “Temporary” Marriages, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN (Jan. 23,
2006),
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/26074/iraq-women%E2%80%99s-groupsblast-%E2%80%9Ctemporary%E2%80%9D-marriages [hereinafter Women’s Group] (reporting
that, according to one NGO, “more than 300 temporary marriages occur daily in Kerbala, Najaf
and Basra, Iraq’s three main Shi’ite cities”).
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part by the economic and human toll of the 2003 invasion, which has left
many without adequate financial means.50
C. Mutʿa in Iraq: Juristic Rulings
As mentioned earlier in this Article, Ayatollah Sistani, despite his
lack of an official political position, is the most powerful man in Iraq.51
His rulings tend to be followed widely and, as a religious matter, are binding on individual believers.52
Sistani’s rulings on mutʿa are particularly fascinating when understood in the context of the foregoing historical and political developments. If one were to examine his fatāwa collections without any
knowledge of broader political debates and historical developments in
Iraq, it would be impossible to know that temporary marriage is such a
contested issue. This is surprising, given that, with respect to other matters, Sistani has used his platform as a religious leader to encourage important changes in Iraqi society. In doing so, he has often engaged with
the Iraqi state, whether to promote its policies or to express his disagreement. For example, when Iraq held its first elections, Sistani issued a
fatwa encouraging women to participate in the democratic election process.53 This was hailed by some Western pundits as a transformative
50. Id.
51. Gleave, supra note 9, at 64.
52. Id. at 67.
53. I was unable to locate the original press release on Sistani’s website. Charles Kurzman
cited to the original text in an article titled “Pro-U.S. Fatwas”, but that link is no longer active.
Instead, a PDF copy of the Arabic fatwa, along with an English translation, can be found on the
website of Sistani’s London office. The Reply by Grand Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Al-Hussaini Al-Seestani in Response to an Inquiry Made by a Group of Iraqi People Regarding the Preparation of the
Next Iraqi Constitution, LIAISON OFFICE OF GRAND AYATULLAH AL-SAYYID AL-SEESTANI,
IMAM ALI FOUNDATION LONDON, (Jun. 26 2003), http://www.najaf.org/english/?&art_id=41
[hereinafter Reply by Grand Ayatullah] (noting that “there must be a general election so that every
Iraqi citizen – who is eligible to vote – can choose someone to represent him” [emphasis mine]).
Juan Cole, an expert on Shiʿism, says that Sistani’s language “is quite distinctly drawn from the
Enlightenment, from Rousseau and from Jefferson.” Babak Dehghanpiseh, What Sistani Wants,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2005), https://www.newsweek.com/what-sistani-wants-122691 (noting that
Sistani demonstrates a remarkable understanding of world politics in many of his legal rulings).
Press Release, Office of Sayyid Sistani, Los Angeles Times Question 1, (Jul. 2, 2003),
https://www.sistani.org/arabic/archive/237/ [hereinafter Press Release, Los Angeles Times Question] (noting in one of the press releases on his website, where he answers questions posed by the
Los Angeles Times, Sistani argues against having the constitution drafted by individuals picked by
the United States by pointing to the experience of East Timor, where the constitution was drafted
by a council under the supervision of the United Nations). Press Release, Office of Sayyid Sistani,
A Message to Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak After His Statements About Shiite
Loyalty, (Mar. 30, 2006), https://www.sistani.org/arabic/statement/1495/ [hereinafter Press Release, Message to Mubarak] (noting Sistani’s knowledge of contemporary events, Sistani’s website
includes a letter to Hosni Mubarak, who had claimed that Shīʿa are not loyal to their countries) .
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moment.54 It is my view that such an intervention was indeed transformative, although not because of what it indicated about his views on gender
and power. I argue that this moment was important because it showed
that Sistani was willing to use his platform, as a religious leader, to engage with the state on certain matters, even if such matters were outside
the traditional purview of Shīʿī ulema. But as this Article will demonstrate, Sistani’s willingness to engage with the rules and institutions of
the state is subject to certain limitations. In particular, with respect to
temporary marriage, Sistani is reluctant to acknowledge that the state
does or should play any role in its regulation.
This is particularly fascinating because, in a response to a question
about the requirement for Western Muslims to follow the laws of a nonMuslim country, Sistani has stated that a person must abide by the laws
of the country in which he lives.55 The only exception is where such laws
are “contrary to the sacred laws of Islam.”56 Engaging with the state when
it comes to marital law, especially on matters such as registration requirements, is certainly not a violation of sacred law.
Thus, one of the central arguments of this paper is that Sistani’s relationship with, and modus operandi with regard to, Iraq’s political system is complex. What drives Sistani’s insistence on disregarding the state
in marital law matters as opposed to other matters? At least part of the
answer lies in the importance he assigns to marriage in helping individuals fulfill religious obligations and avoid prohibited actions. In a 2015
letter responding to a group of college students and social activists (written in English), Sistani advises them “to start a family by getting married
and procreating without any delay.”57 Among other things, marriage is “a
defense against forbidden and lowly deeds.”58 Granted, this is not particularly surprising, given that he is a traditional Muslim jurist, but this perspective is important to understand because it sheds insight into why Sistani may not care too much about burdening individuals with state
54. See, e.g., Najaf: Top Shiite Cleric Inspires Many to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/international/middleeast/najaf-top-shiite-cleric-inspiresmany-to-vote.html (“If election day belonged to anyone, that person was Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani.”).
55. Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani, A CODE OF PRACTICE FOR MUSLIMS IN THE WEST
(Najim al-Khafaji, BA ed., Sayyid Mohammad Rizvi trans., Imam Ali Foundation
1999), https://www.sistani.org/english/book/46/2051/.
56. Al-Sayyid Alī al-Husaynī al-Sīstānī, AL-FIQH LIL-MUGHTARIBĪN 33, https://www.sistani.org/files/lib,11.pdf.
57. Press Release, Office of Sayyid Sistani, Advice from His Eminence, Sayyid Ali al-Sistani
(May the Almighty Prolong His Life) to the Believing Youth (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.sistani.org/english/archive/25240/ [hereinafter Press Release, al-Sistani Advice to Youth].
58. Id.
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registration requirements and laws. In this same letter, Sistani appears
particularly concerned about the chastity of women, warning that
“women are more affected by the consequences of neglecting [chastity]
due to their delicateness.”59 He further warns against “casual relationships
whose enjoyment ends quickly.”60 Neither of these statements is surprising, coming from a Muslim jurist. What is interesting, however, is that
mutʿa has been criticized precisely for these reasons. In other words, critics often charge that mutʿa is a cover for casual relationships. Although
this may be empirically true, the important point here is that Sistani is not
proactive about noting that mutʿa should not be used for these purposes.
When forced to address the issue of temporary marriage because of embarrassing media reports, however, Sistani does offer some clarification,
although he does not retract his stance.61
In the pages that follow, I have examined a subset of the mutʿa-related fatāwa available in Sistani’s books and website.62 The discourse
found in his writings shows that Sistani writes as if he is operating in a
legal vacuum. That is to say, there is virtually no acknowledgment of state
requirements. This can be explained partly due to the genre of the writings themselves. But I argue that it is indicative of a broader trend in Sistani’s legal thought, whereby he is very deliberate in engaging with the
state in only certain matters, and ignoring them in others. While my case
study pertains to temporary marriage, the findings can be applied to his
rulings more generally, and thus tells us something about how he conceptualizes his role as a religious leader vis-a-vis the state.
D. Sistani’s Rulings Regarding Marriage
1. Marriage Formula
Within the Shīʿī tradition, it is standard for collections of fatāwa to
include a discussion on the mechanics of a marital contract. Perhaps the
most infamous feature of contracts for temporary marriage is the requirement of mentioning the length of the marriage. Sistani explains “if he [the
husband] does not mention it intentionally, or out of forgetfulness,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Press Release, Office of Sayyid Sistani, Questions from BBC About Some Inappropriate
Practices, and the Responses to Them (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.sistani.org/english/archive/26348/ [hereinafter Press Release, Response to Questions from BBC] (noting Sistani has
provided only limited qualifications to his stance, and those too possibly driven by his view that
preserving the reputation of Islam is an important factor when conducting one’s matters).
62. Many other general fatāwa related to marriage, which refer to both permanent and temporary marriage, have not been analyzed.
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negligence, shyness, or otherwise, the temporary marriage is invalid.”63
Interestingly, Sistani does not care to engage with the criticisms of having
a set term in either his legal rulings or his other public-facing statements.
Even when he is responding to a critical question from the media, Sistani
is very clear that temporary marriage is permitted within the Shīʿī tradition.64
The discussion regarding the mechanics of the marital contract includes the exact words that must be stated by each party in order to finalize a marriage.65 There are differences of opinion on whether the words
must be stated in Arabic,66 but the process is not particularly lengthy or
difficult. In fact, a marriage is considered sanctioned from a religious perspective even if a cleric is not present.67
The entire procedure is markedly different from what is necessary
in Iraq to obtain a marriage certificate, which requires parties to appear
in front of a judge to submit an application for marriage, conduct a medical examination, and then return to the court with two witnesses.68 Nowhere in Sistani’s website, including books available in PDF format, does
one find a reference to the civil requirements of a country for conducting
marriage.
There is a large body of secondary literature that examines the problems faced by Muslims simultaneously navigating civil and religious
laws of marriage and divorce.69 This problem is particularly acute in the
63. Al-Sayyid ʿAlī al-Husaynī al-Sīstānī, MINHĀJ AL-SĀLIHĪN - AL-JUZ AL-THĀLITH (ALTABʿA AL-MUSAHHIHA WA AL-MANQAHA 1442 H), 81 (Fatwa 243) (2021), https://www.sistani.org/files-new/book-pdf/arabic-menhaj-3-1439.pdf.
64. Press Release, Response to Questions from BBC, supra note 61.
65. Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 78 (Fatwa 231).
66. Id. at 77 (Fatwa 229) (stating this is not necessary).
67. Al-Sīstānī, AL-FIQH LIL-MUGHTARIBĪN, supra note 56, at 33.
68. Marriage in Iraq, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN IRAQ, https://www.iq.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/marriage-in-iraq/.
69. See, e.g., Molouk Berry, Divorce in an Islamic American Context: Muslim LebaneseAmerican Women Navigating Religious and Civil Legal Systems, 8 J. OF WOMEN OF THE MIDDLE
EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD 1 (2010) (arguing that American Muslims may need to move toward supplementing the traditional marital contract with an addendum, which would stipulate that
women have the right to divorce; the article also suggests a new reading of “custom” to take into
account the American legal system, and thereby adopt some of the assumptions embedded therein
into Islamic divorce jurisprudence); Mahmoud Jaraba, The Prac. of Khulʿ in Ger. Pragmatism Versus Conservativism, 26 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 1-2 (2019) (noting that for couples in Germany who
are religiously married but have not civilly registered their marriage, the state remains largely uninvolved with any breakdown in the marriage); Bustami Khir, The Right of Women to No-Fault
Divorce in Islam and ItsApplication by British Muslims, 17 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM
RELATIONS 295 (2006) (noting the problem of “limping marriages” in British contexts (wherein a
civil divorce may exist, but no Islamic divorce), and documents alternative legal mechanisms
sought by British Muslims, including “the recognition of a separate system of personal law for
Muslims” and “various methods of alternative dispute resolution to regulate their marriages and

FINAL_TO_JCI

264

7/7/22 10:08 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 45.4

West, where individuals who have not registered their marriages with the
state are often able to skirt their civil responsibilities, or alternatively,
keep their partner in a state of legal limbo.70 In response to this, both European courts, and even some Islamic bodies, are working to address the
issue with ad-hoc solutions.71 However, to this author’s knowledge, no
such effort is in the pipeline from Sistani or other Shīʿī jurists, for whom
a simple marriage formula is enough to validate a marriage.72
2. Financial Maintenance
Another important ruling that intersects closely with the requirements of Iraqi civil law is regarding financial maintenance. From the perspective of Shīʿī jurists, one of the main benefits of a temporary marriage,
as opposed to a non-regulated casual relationship, is that a woman is accorded the status of a wife,73 and any children born of the relationship are
considered legitimate offspring.74 Yet, the status of the woman as a wife,
and the status of the children as legitimate, is differentiated from those in
a permanent marriage, and are also very different from the corresponding

divorces in conformity with Islamic law”; the article also highlights the work of the Islamic Sharia
Council in Great Britain, an Islamic body which deals with thousands of matrimonial disputes and
offers no-fault divorces to women); Zahra Ayubi, Negotiating Justice: American Muslim Women
Navigating Islamic Divorce and Civil Law, 30 J. FOR ISLAMIC STUD. 78 (2010) (suggesting that in
the American Muslim context, an alternative framework needs to be developed to address the tensions between civil and religious divorces); Esther Eijk, Khulʿ Divorce in the Netherlands: Dutch
Muslim Women Seeking Religious Divorce, 26 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 36 (2019) (examining a European court’s attempt to interpret matters of Islamic law and its use of novel legal reasoning that
enabled a Muslim woman to achieve an Islamic divorce); Rafidah Cusairi, Procedure of Issuing
Religious Divorce and Resolving Matrimonial Disputes at Sharīʿah Councils in the UK, 21 ARAB
L. Q. 1 (2018) (providing an in-depth look at the Islamic law tribunal system of the Islamic Sharia
Council in East London, United Kingdom); Mohammad Fadel, Political Liberalism, Islamic Family Law, and Family Law Pluralism, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT
164 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012) (examining the controversy of Islamic family law tribunals in Western countries, and making a philosophical argument for “a liberal family law” for Muslims as opposed to giving “power directly to religious bodies in the administration of family law”); but see
Rozaliya Garipova, Married or not Married? On the Obligatory Registration of Muslim Marriages
in Nineteenth-Century Russia, 24 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 112-13 (2017) (arguing that state registration of marital acts, including divorce, “came to be seen as acts against shariʿa”).
70. See, e.g., Jaraba, supra note 69; Khir, supra note 69.
71. See, e.g., Khir, supra note 69; Cusairi, supra note 69.
72. Based on anecdotal evidence, there are many clerics in the American Shīʿī community
who require a civil marriage certificate in order to facilitate a religious marriage ceremony. Note,
however, that a marriage can be completed by two individuals without the presence of a cleric.
73. Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, AL-FIQH ‘ALA MADHĀHIB AL-KHAMSA 366 (1979) (“The
Shī’a state: The revocation of temporary marriage has not been established. It was legally permissible and it will continue to be legally permissible until the Day of Judgment.”).
74. Id. (“The child of a temporary marriage is a legally recognized child. It has all of the rights
that legally recognized children have, without exception of any legal or moral rights.”).
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status under Iraqi civil law. With regard to temporary marriage, Sistani
states:
Financial maintenance for the temporary wife is not obligatory upon
her husband. If she becomes pregnant from him, she is not entitled to it
[i.e., financial maintenance] from her husband except if she made that a
condition of the contract of the temporary marriage or it is required pursuant to another contract.75
This is radically different from Iraqi civil law, which provides that
a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband.76 This is of course the
ruling promulgated by Shīʿī jurists regarding permanent marriage as well.
Iraq’s Personal Status Law does not differentiate between maintenance
for a woman who is pregnant and one who is not, although it does separately state that a father must provide for his child.77 Again, this is the
ruling for permanent marriages as well. The reluctance by Sistani to address the issue of maintenance of a temporary wife beyond the mahr
amount is interesting because it further strengthens the charge by critics
that mutʿa is often used as a cover for illicit sexual transactions, which
Sistani has been quick to say is a misuse of the institution.78
Sistani further opines that the ignorance of a wife with respect to the
lack of a maintenance obligation does not invalidate the marriage: “A
temporary marriage contract is valid even if the wife is ignorant of the
fact that she is not entitled to financial maintenance. . . and she does not
obtain a right on her husband due to her ignorance.”79
This is a point that is understandably not covered by Iraqi civil law,
since ignorance is rarely a defense under most legal codes. Ignorance in
religious matters, however, can sometimes serve as a defense, or at least
a mitigating factor. In the situation at hand, Sistani is presumably protecting against a scenario where a woman would plead ignorance, and thus
try to invalidate a marriage. This could be especially problematic for a
man where a child is involved, since a child of such a marriage (i.e., a
marriage that is nullified) would not be considered legitimate.
3. Inheritance
The last matter we will examine that intersects closely with Iraqi
civil law is inheritance. In his ruling on the subject, Sistani notes the
75.
76.
1959.
77.
78.
79.

Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 84 (Fatwa 256).
Personal Status Law, al-Waqā’i’ al-’Irāqīyah [Iraqi Official Gazette] No. 280 of Dec. 30,
Id. at Article 59.
Press Release, Response to Questions from BBC, supra note 61.
Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 84 (Fatwa 257).
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following: “In a temporary marriage, inheritance between the spouses is
not permitted, and if inheritance is a mutual condition or a condition of
one of them, then the evidence of the condition of inheritance is not permitted.”80
In Iraqi civil law, on the other hand, the wife does have the right to
inherit (although that is in contemplation of a permanent marriage).81 This
is a conflict that is perhaps even more serious than that of financial
maintenance, because the amounts in question are potentially much
larger. That inheritance is not considered necessary by Sistani further
demonstrates that he is quite committed to ensuring the survival of the
institution of mutʿa independent of state requirements.
One other interesting distinction here: financial maintenance can be
a requirement if agreed to between the parties as a requirement of the
contract.82 Inheritance, however, is invalid, even if pre-negotiated as an
element of the contract.83
The rulings discussed above are interesting because they provide a
window into the tension between Iraqi civil laws and the laws of temporary marriage as conceptualized by Sistani. One might observe that Iraqi
civil laws are based on the Islamic laws of permanent marriage, which
might explain several important differences with the laws of temporary
marriage under Sistani’s system. As I have tried pointing out, however,
the object of our analysis should be Sistani’s reaction to such laws (or
lack thereof), especially in the post-Saddam era, where he has played an
outsized political role in the laws of the country. For whatever reason,
Sistani is committed to ensuring that the laws of temporary marriage remain intact, and will not even entertain engagement with the state, even
if it would be in the public interest or would further preserve the reputation of Islam (a concern of his expressed in multiple legal rulings). However, he is more than willing to change his views on classically held positions when necessary because of the challenges of political governance,
including regarding laws relating to banking and democratic participation.
4. Temporary Marriages with Non-Muslims
One of the hallmarks of Sistani’s activism in the post-Saddam period has been to increase inter-faith and intra-faith harmony. In the early
days of the U.S. invasion, Sistani played a crucial role in preventing
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 84 (Fatwa 255).
Personal Status Law, supra note 76, at Article 35.
Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 84 (Fatwa 256).
Id. at 84 (Fatwa 255).
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retaliations against Sunnis for unchecked violence against the Shīʿa.84 He
is also known for brokering a ceasefire between the U.S. army and
Moqtada al-Sadr during one particularly sensitive period of the war.85
Over the years, he has consistently issued statements regarding the importance of protecting the rights of non-Muslim minorities, including
countering the atrocities committed by ISIS.86 And perhaps most famously, the Pope visited Sistani in Najaf in 2021, a remarkable display
of Sistani’s reach in the broader world.87
Yet for all these overtures, it is not clear that interfaith marriage is
an institution that is thriving in Iraq, 88 despite being protected by the Personal Status Law. The cleavages between religions and communities have
only sharpened in the post-Saddam era. Given the foregoing considerations, Sistani’s rulings on temporary marriage with non-Muslims offers
fascinating insight into his religious and political priorities. Sistani focuses on a few specific use cases that appear to be of marginal utility,
although based on the attention given to them, provide the impression that
they are of urgent concern to practitioners.
The first such case that we will examine here is the marriage of Muslim males with non-Muslim females (focusing specifically on Christians,
Jews, and Zoroastrians). That Sistani even found it necessary to comment
on this issue is an interesting choice, given that up to 98% of Iraq identifies as Muslim,89 the Christian population has decreased by up to 90%
since 2003,90 and there are few Zoroastrians in the country, mostly concentrated in Kurdistan.91 Take, for example, the following legal ruling:
84. Iraqi cleric al-Sistani issues call to curb violence, CBC NEWS (July 21, 2006),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iraqi-cleric-al-sistani-issues-call-to-curb-violence-1.600179
85. Dexter Filkins, Militants Leave Shrine as Cease-Fire Deal Appears to Hold, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/27/international/middleeast/militants-leaveshrine-as-ceasefire-deal-appears-to.html.
86. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 34.
87. Jason Horowitz & Jane Arraf, Pope Francis Meets Iraq’s Top Ayatollah as Both Urge
Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/world/europe/pope-francis-iraq-ayatollah-sistani.html.
88. According to data published by Pew Research Center in 2013, only 13% of Iraqi Muslims
would be very or somewhat comfortable with having their son marry a Christian. Only 4% would
be very or somewhat comfortable with having their daughter marry a Christian. Chapter 6: Interfaith Relations in The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Apr. 20, 2013), https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-interfaith-relations/.
89. Iraq, The World Factbook, CIA https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iraq/.
90. Id.
91. Zoroastrianism appears to be gaining popularity in Kurdistan over the last few years,
partly as a result of the disenchantment caused by the brutal policies of ISIS. One organization that
promotes Zoroastrianism in Kurdistan reported that 15,000 people have registered with it. See Bruneau & Omar, Zoroastrians Make a Comeback in Northern Iraq, But Still Face Stigma, REUTERS
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“It is permitted for a Muslim male to marry a Jewish female or a Christian
female, in a temporary marriage but out of obligatory precaution, it is
preferable to avoid a marriage with a non-Muslim woman altogether.“92
Note that, contrary to the positions of the major Sunni legal schools
of Islam, most Shīʿī jurists do not permit Muslim males to marry Christian or Jewish females in a permanent marriage. It is standard, however,
to permit such a union in the context of a temporary marriage, as Sistani
does above.93 Why this distinction? Although Sistani does not elaborate
on the legal basis for his conclusion, it is interesting to note that, even
though this is the classical position of the Shīʿī school, Sistani does not
acknowledge the empirical reality that mutʿa is often a front for casual
relationships. Thus, it is particularly striking that he endorses marriage
with non-Muslims only on a temporary basis, but not on a permanent basis. One is left to wonder whether his decision to adhere to the classical
fiqh position is also driven by an embedded social goal (e.g., preserving
the Islamic family unit in the context of a permanent marriage).
Elsewhere, Sistani states the following: “As for a non-believing
Muslim woman who is not a kitābiyya, it is not permitted for a Muslim
male to marry her at all, and out of obligatory precaution it is not even
permitted with a Zoroastrian, even if only as a temporary marriage.”94
Again, this is a curious choice for Sistani to opine on, given the fact
that non-kitābis make up an even smaller percentage of Iraq’s population.95 One may object that outside of Iraq (i.e., especially in the West),
the chances of interfaith mixing are higher, and this may explain Sistani’s
focus on interfaith temporary marriages.
From a substantive perspective, the ruling is not a surprise, as any
classical fiqh manual will also prohibit marriage with a non-kitābi. In
fact, even Iraq’s Personal Status Law prohibits a Muslim man from marrying a non-kitābi.96
Lastly, on this topic, the reader may be interested to read the following: “It is not permitted for a Muslim male married to a Muslim female,

(Sep. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-religion-zoroastrianism/zoroastriansmake-a-comeback-in-northern-iraq-but-still-face-stigma-idUSKBN26L336.
92. Al-Sīstānī, AL-FIQH LIL-MUGHTARIBĪN, supra note 56.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Interfaith Marriages Still a Rarity in the Muslim World, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
https://www.dw.com/en/interfaith-marriages-still-a-rarity-in-the-muslim-world/a-50391076 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2022).
96. Personal Status Law, supra note 76, at Articles 12–13, 17.

FINAL_TO_JCI

2022]

7/7/22 10:08 PM

Shīʿī Legal Discourses in Iraq and Lebanon

269

to marry a second woman from among the People of the Book, such as a
Jew or a Christian, without the permission of his Muslim wife.”97
The foregoing ruling regarding temporary marriage with non-Muslims when one is married to a Muslim woman is somewhat puzzling. Why
is there a distinction regarding the requirement for permission when the
additional temporary wife is a kitābi, whereas no such permission is required when the additional temporary wife is a Muslim? One plausible
answer is that the ruling derives from a recognition that it may be easier
to conduct a temporary marriage secretly when it is outside of one’s own
community. In order to make such a scenario more difficult, permission
from a Muslim wife is required. This also strengthens the argument that
Sistani is very concerned about the Islamic family unit within the context
of a permanent marriage, as demonstrated by some of the other rulings
discussed above. Another plausible answer is that, given the great care
Sistani has taken to cultivate relationships with interfaith communities,
he is likely interested in preserving the goodwill of members of those
communities, and that too in secret. This would obviously be negatively
impacted if Muslim men are conducting temporary marriages with members of those communities in secret. But neither of these answers is completely satisfactory. If the rulings are driven by social concerns, then why
allow temporary marriage at all? This is something that requires further
thought and consideration.
5. Chastity
As alluded to above, Sistani’s concern with chastity is curious, and
perhaps counter-intuitive, given his wholehearted acceptance of temporary marriage. While temporary marriage is a way to religiously sanction
a short-term sexual relationship, one would think that its clear potential
for abuse would cause jurists like Sistani some concern.
Sistani’s discourse regarding chastity in the context of temporary
marriage, however, indicates a concern with an entirely different set of
issues. Instead of commenting on the potential of temporary marriages to
impinge on such chastity, Sistani opines that the woman with whom one
is contracting a marriage should be chaste (there is no commentary on the
chastity of the man).98
It is recommended that the one with whom a mutʿa marriage is contracted is a chaste believer, and out of obligatory precaution one should
ask about her state before marriage with her, regarding whether she has a
97. Al-Sīstānī, AL-FIQH LIL-MUGHTARIBĪN, supra note 56.
98. Id.
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husband or is in a waiting period (if she is a person accused of this type
of thing). As for after marriage, one should not ask; even if he knows
something necessary to accuse her; but if he asks and a difference is apparent, he should act according to this ruling.99
Based on the foregoing, one could argue that the purpose of this ruling is to prohibit women who are in the profession of selling sex from
entering into temporary marriages. But if that is the case, it is a highly
indirect method of achieving this objective. The Iraqi Personal Status
Law, for example, does not entertain any discussion regarding the chastity of an individual.100 This is of course possible because temporary marriage is banned altogether.
In another section, Sistani provides a ruling regarding temporary
marriage with a woman known for adulterous behavior: “It is permitted
to contract a temporary marriage with an adulterous woman. If she was
famous for adultery, it is only permitted after she repents.”101
While he permits a marriage with such a woman (note that there is
no discussion regarding a man known for adulterous behavior), this is
only the case if she is remorseful for her past actions. Again, one could
argue that Sistani is prohibiting certain types of individuals (i.e., prostitutes) from engaging in temporary marriage. If that is his intention, however, it is being carried out in a highly inefficient manner.
More broadly, whether or not achieving certain social goals is at the
heart of Sistani’s decision-making process when it comes to the discourse
on chastity, one is left to wonder about the efficacy and practicality of
such technical legal discussions for a matter that has become one of urgent concern for the Iraqi public. As noted above, mutʿa is itself a controversial practice because it is a marital contract with a fixed period,
which many have compared to legalized prostitution.102 Since the U.S.
invasion, the practice has received significant media scrutiny, culminating in a bombshell 2019 investigative piece where journalists used a hidden camera to record Iraqi clerics offering to facilitate temporary marriages with underage girls.103 The BBC team that conducted this
investigation posed several questions to Sistani, whose office made his
responses public and offers a fascinating insight into his worldview. In
this statement, Sistani notes that temporary marriage “is allowed in the
99. Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63.
100. See Personal Status Law, supra note 76.
101. Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 85 (Fatwa 261).
102. Press Release, Response to Questions from BBC, supra note 61.
103. Nawal Al-Maghafi, In Iraq, Religious ‘Pleasure Marriages’ Are a Front for Child Prostitution, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/06/pleasuremarriages-iraq-baghdad-bbc-investigation-child-prostitution.
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Shia Imamiya school of thought,”104 but says that it “cannot be used as a
means for sex trade as stated, as that would disgrace the dignity of a
woman and her humanity.”105 He goes on to further state:
[I]t is incumbent upon the relevant official authorities to take deterrent legal action against such disgraceful behaviour, wherever that may
be. However, what is noticeable unfortunately is the weakness of the rule
of law in this country, which has allowed some to carry out a range of
illegitimate practices, until it reached the point of running brothels and
promoting them.106
In response to a question noting that prior versions of his fiqh rulings
permitted temporary marriage with underage females, Sistani justified the
recent removal by noting that:
until recently [underage marriage was] very common in many Eastern societies, and hence the book of religious rulings included some of its
rules in its previous versions, but it was observed that it had receded at
current times, and that was removed in the latest versions. What we wish
to emphasise is that the parent of a girl cannot give permission for her
marriage unless it is in her interest, and most often there is no interest in
her marriage until she reaches physical maturity and mental preparedness
for sexual activity, as it is also not in her interest to marry in contravention
to law which would make her liable for unnecessary repercussions and
problems.107
Sistani’s response here indicates a delicate balance between upholding a practice that is unequivocally accepted by Shīʿī jurists, and addressing drastic abuses taking place based on his religious rulings within a few
miles of his residence. The fact that the rulings addressing underage marriage were removed from the books is interesting, if only because they do
not prove anything other than the fact that Sistani does not believe it is
necessary to publicize this aspect of the law.
What can we make of the seeming contradiction between, on the one
hand, the efforts of Iraqi government officials, human rights advocates,
and Islamist political parties, all of whom are engaging directly with the
state, and on the other hand, the juristic legal rulings regarding temporary
marriage? One response is to chalk up Sistani’s rulings to the genre itself,
which does not typically engage with local or geopolitical developments.
That is a fair answer. But another answer, which is more compelling, is
that this is a conscientious choice to hold onto tradition, without being
104.
105.
106.
107.

Press Release, Response to Questions from BBC, supra note 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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subject to outside forces. Despite numerous pressures in Iraq, Sistani is
able to hold his ground on this matter, and in fact, opines on matters as if
he is operating in a vacuum. This is particularly strange when one considers that Sistani is very worldly (as are many top Shīʿī jurists),108 and in
fact, other parts of his writing demonstrate engagement with the state. He
is often very proactive and not shy to deviate from his formerly quietist
stance.
IV. LEBANON
A. Legal and Juristic Background of Lebanon
The involvement of religious figures in modern Lebanese politics
began after the arrival of Ayatollah Musa al-Sadr from Qom.109 He mobilized the Shīʿī community through a variety of initiatives, including establishing the Supreme Islamic Shia Council and founding Amal, an
armed Lebanese group. 110Al-Sadr disappeared under mysterious circumstances en route to a meeting with Gaddafi in 1978,111 but the momentum
of Shīʿī mobilization did not stop there. With the onset of the civil war,
Israel’s invasion of 1978, the killing of Imam Musa al-Sadr, and the 1979
Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah was born.112 The party was “loosely organized and largely clandestine” until the mid 1980s.113 Hezbollah started
participating in parliamentary elections in 1992,114 and has since become

108. For example, Sistani references Will Durant and Alfred Hitchcock in his work. Al-Sayyid
ʿAlī al-Husaynī al-Sīstānī, supra note 56, at 33 (“The world famous cinema director Alfred Hitchcock said: The Eastern woman is extremely attractive in and of herself, and this attraction gave her
a lot of power. But by taking big steps to emulate her Western sister, the Eastern woman gradually
abandoned her hijab, and her sexual attractiveness continued to decrease gradually.”).
109. See generally FOUAD AJAM, THE VANISHED IMAM: MUSA AL SADR AND THE SHIA OF
LEBANON 124 (Cornell Univ. Press 1986) (discussing Musa al-Sadr’s emergence on the national
scene).
110. Nawal Mustafa, Amal and Harakat Al-Mahrumun: The Rise of Shi’a Social Movements
in Lebanon 2, 21 (May 6, 2008), https://www.auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/0708capstones%3A235/datastream/PDF/view.
111. Rick Gladstone, The Shah of Iran, the Islamic Revolution and the Mystery of the Missing
Imam, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/middleeast/iranshah-reza-pahlavi-shiite-cleric-moussa-al-sadr.html?_r=1.
112. CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
HEZBOLLAH:
BACKGROUND
AND
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
7
(2011),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf.
113. Id. at 8.
114. A. Nizar Hamzeh, Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation, 14 THIRD WORLD Q. 321, 324-25 (1993).
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a dominant force in Lebanese politics, including its outsized role against
Israel in the 2006 invasion.115
B. Mutʿa in Lebanon: Legislation
Marriage in Lebanon is governed by The Law of the Rights of the
Family 1962.116 Under this system, “there are 15 separate personal status
laws for the country’s different recognized religious communities.”117
One of these is Jaʿfari law, which is applied to the Shīʿa, as a civil marriage does not exist in Lebanon.118 All marriages must be conducted by a
religious authority.119 Marriages are required to be registered, although
failure to do so does not invalidate a marriage.120 In other words, there is
no legislation regarding mutʿa in Lebanon; religious authorities have the
authority to conduct marriages as they please.
The movement to regulate civil marriage gained steam in the 1990s,
culminating with a proposal by then-President Elias Hrawi to permit “optional civil marriage.”121 This proposal was approved by the cabinet but
ultimately rejected due to pressure from religious authorities.122 In 2011,
another proposal was submitted to parliament, but this failed as well.123

115. FACTBOX: Costs of war and recovery in Lebanon and Israel, REUTERS (July 9, 2007),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-war-cost/factbox-costs-of-war-and-recovery-in-lebanon-and-israel-idUSL0822571220070709.
116. Law of 16 July 1962, art. 1 (Law Regulating the Sunni and Jaafari Sharia Judiciary) (Leb.)
(“The Sunni and Ja’fari Sharia courts constitute part of the state’s judiciary organization”). See
generally Max Weiss, Practicing Sectarianism in Mandate Lebanon: Shici Cemeteries, Religious
Patrimony, and the Everyday Politics of Difference, 43 J. SOC. HIST. 707, 710 (2010) (noting that
Arrete N 3503 of January 17, 1926, accomplished the formal recognition of the Ja’fari madhab as
‘an independent madhab’ by decree of the French mandate authorities.”).
117. HUM. R. WATCH, UNEQUAL AND UNPROTECTED WOMEN’S RIGHTS UNDER LEBANESE
PERSONAL STATUS LAWS 2 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon0115_ForUpload.pdf.
118. Id. at 20.
119. Marriage, U.S. EMBASSY IN LEBANON, https://www.lb.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/marriage/ (last visited May 28, 2022).
120. CAROLINE STARKEY & EMMA TOMALIN, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGION,
GENDER, AND SOCIETY 228 (2022) [hereinafter THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK].
121. Sophie Chamas, When Weddings Become Protests: The Debate Over Civil Marriage in
Lebanon, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.deseret.com/2015/3/18/20560939/whenweddings-become-protests-the-debate-over-civil-marriage-in-lebanon#a-lebanese-activist-holdsa-placard-in-arabic-that-reads-i-want-to-get-married-again-a-civil-marriage-for-sure-as-hemarches-with-others-during-a-protest-demanding-a-law-that-guarantees-any-lebanese-citizen-theright-to-a-civil-marriage-in-beirut-lebanon-sunday-march-1-2015-civil-marriage-is-banned-inlebanon-and-only-religious-marriages-are-allowed-ap-photo-hussein-malla.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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In 2013, the state registered its first civil marriage,124 followed by a handful of others; although this policy has now been reversed.125
C. Mutʿa in Lebanon: Juristic Rulings
Given the fact that religious authorities in Lebanon have the power
to regulate marriages as they see fit, juristic rulings on the matter do not
face the same pressures as they do in Iraq. For the purposes of my analysis, I will examine the rulings of Ayatollah Fadlallah, a very important
Shīʿī figure in Lebanon. Fadlallah was born and completed his religious
education in Najaf, where he received training from Ayatollah Hakim and
Ayatollah Khoei, among others.126 He moved to Lebanon in 1966.127
While he was not prominent during Musa al-Sadr’s lifetime (and in fact
was a critic of his work), Fadlallah established credibility through his involvement in building schools, hospitals, and social centers.128 He eventually gained a wide religious following in Lebanon and the West, particularly because of his relatively liberal views regarding women.129 There
is some question about whether he achieved the unanimous approval
which is customary in order to be considered a marjaʿ.130
Fadlalalh died in 2010, but established Shīʿī doctrine holds that followers of a marjaʿ can continue to follow him after his death, if they so
choose.131 Fadlallah is also the first major marjaʿ to die in the internet age,
and so his office’s publications since his death have been somewhat of a
novelty and possibly an example for others, especially as many of the
other major marāje’ approach their eighties, nineties, and one

124. The first civil marriage was registered in 2013, but subsequent regulatory decisions have
discontinued the practice. Jean Aziz, Lebanon’s First Civil Marriage a Sign of Change, ALMONITOR (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2013/04/lebanon-first-civil-marriage-political-change.html.
125. Chamas, supra note 121.
126. Life of Sayyed Fadlullah(ra), BAYYNAT (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.english.bayynat.org.l
b/Biography/Biography_stages_life.htm.
127. Id.
128. Talib Aziz, Fadlallah and the Remaking of the Marjaʿiya in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE
SHIʿA: THE INSTITUTION OF THE MARJʿA TAQLID 207 (Linda S. Walbridge ed., 2010).
129. He has gained particular infamy among some Shīʿī communities because of his controversial positions, including one permitting female masturbation. Al Hukm al-Istimnā’ – al-ʿĀda alSarrīa, BAYYNAT, http://www.arabic.bayynat.org/HtmlSecondary.aspx?id=9718.
130. Aziz, supra note 124, at 208.
131. Abbas Kadhim & Barbara Slavin, After Sistani and Khamenei: Looming Successions Will
Shape the Middle East, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (July 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/After_Sistani_and_Khamenei-Looming_Successions_Will_Shape_the_Middle_East.pdf (Abbas Kadhim and Barbara Slavin wrote about the looming succession crisis in the Shīʿī clerical leadership.).
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hundreds.132 For this reason, I have decided to analyze the rulings of
Fadlallah, whose influence is still felt today in Lebanon. Although he has
denied links to Hizbullah, Fadlallah was undoubtedly a crucial player in
the makeup of the state, given his widespread following and his network
of social services.133 For this reason, his rulings on marital law also tell a
broader story about the law and statehood in Lebanon.
In the rulings that follow, I will point out some of the key differences
that Fadlallah has with Sistani. Some of these differences can be attributed to the environment and influences of each scholar. I argue, however, that their distinctive laws are also a product of alternative visions of
the role that a major Shīʿī figure should play in the operation of a state.
Sistani sees himself playing an important role, but he is deliberate about
what debates he is willing to enter into. Fadlallah, on the other hand, was
much more deliberate in working to bring Islamic laws into conformance
with developments in the modern state. This is reflected in his discourse
on temporary marriage.
D. Fadlallah’s Rulings on Temporary Marriage
1. Marriage Formula
Fadlallah’s rulings on the mechanics of the marriage formula differ
from those of Sistani in a couple of interesting ways. Like Sistani, Fadlallah provides that stating the term of the marriage is a requirement.134 Unlike Sistani, however, failure to state the term—whether “out of ignorance
or forgetfulness, or intentionally”—does not invalidate the contract.135 Instead, the marriage is deemed to be permanent.136 It is difficult to say
whether the two competing views on the validity of the contract speak to
competing social goals. What is clear, however, is that Fadlallah’s formulation solemnizes the marital relationship, whereas Sistani’s formulation results in a non-legitimate relationship.
Interestingly, the ease with which each scholar facilitates a marital
relationship is reversed when it comes to the actual marriage formula. In
the case of Sistani, the marital formula can be recited in a language other
than English, provided that the individual being married has a rough

132. Id.
133. See id.
134. AL-SAYYID MUHAMMAD HUSAYN FADLALLAH, AHKĀM AL-SHARĪʿA 499 (Fatwa 1449)
http://www.arabic.bayynat.org.lb/Client%20Resources/Books/Files/ahkamshariaa.pdf. Note that
this edition of his rulings was published after his death.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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understanding of what the Arabic language formula says.137 For Fadlallah,
on the other hand, the formula must be recited “in correct classical Arabic.”138 Presumably, the consequences of a failure to do so would make
such a contract invalid, although it is hard to imagine the validity of a
marriage being questioned on this point, especially in an Arabic-speaking
country.
More interestingly, under both Sistani’s and Fadlallah’s formulation, the contract can be verbal.139 As noted above, under Lebanese law,
the fact that a marriage is not registered has no impact on its validity.140
In fact, Shīʿī religious authorities are given broad latitude by the state to
govern their religious matters as they see fit. With that being the case, it
is not surprising that Fadlallah’s fiqh ruling does not engage with the matter of the state. What is interesting, however, is that in a 2007 press release, Fadlallah recommended that “the religious courts should register
this marriage, because certain practices have produced negative results
owing to the absence of any regulation.”141
I argue that this intervention by Fadlallah is monumental. Fadlallah’s advocacy of registering this marriage with the state is a stark contrast with Sistani, who has not made any comment of this nature despite
numerous opportunities to do so. In fact, it is an even more striking position because, unlike Iraq, the failure to register a marriage in Lebanon
does not invalidate the marriage.142 I interpret this statement by Fadlallah
as indicative of a broader social goal. One interpretation is that Fadlallah
wants to reduce the tendency to conduct these marriages in secret. I think
that is certainly one plausible answer and is further supported by his statement that “any marriage based on exploitation, that is using the woman
as a means, is invalid.”143 However, I think that a more compelling perspective is that Fadlallah views his role as a religious leader to be quite
expansive, and this includes close interaction with the state. This would
make sense, given his extensive experience in coordinating with nonprofit organizations that perform state-like activities in delivering aid to

137. Al-Sīstānī, Al-Juz al-Thālith, supra note 63, at 77 (Fatwa 229).
138. FADLALLAH, supra note 134 (Fatwa 1449).
139. See Al-Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, ISLAMIC LAWS (Mohammed Ali Ismail trans.,
Islamic Educ. Dep’t of The World Fed’n, 3d ed. 2017), https://www.sistani.org/english/book
/48/2329/ [hereinafter ISLAMIC LAWS 2387]; FADLOLLAH, ISLAMIC RULINGS: A GUIDE OF
ISLAMIC PRACTICE 311, http://www.english.bayynat.org.lb/Books/Islamic_Rulings.pdf.
140. See THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 120, at 228.
141. Fadlullah calls for Registering the Muta’a marriage in the legal courts, BAYYNAT (July
5, 2007), http://www.english.bayynat.org/Archive_news/05072007.htm.
142. See THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 120, at 228.
143. Id.
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needy families.144 In this way, registering temporary marriages is also
something that would be an important part of adding legitimacy to his
own religious platform.
This recommendation by Fadlallah is also interesting because it
counters the media narrative that religious leaders in Lebanon are promoting this practice in an effort to keep Hezbollah fighters happy. Several
media articles over the past decade, for example, have pointed to the increasing prevalence of the practice, which purportedly serves as an added
incentive to keep members engaged in resistance against Israel.145 If the
guidance from Fadlallah were to be followed, the process of the marriage
would be more cumbersome.
In any case, whether or not imputing such an intention to Fadlallah
is possible, it may be a fruitless endeavor. Given the stigma around temporary marriage and the social mores of the Middle East, it is doubtful
that individuals would willingly register such a marriage. This is notwithstanding the fact that the practice appears to be gaining increasing acceptance among youth in religious communities.
2. Financial Maintenance and Inheritance
Under Shīʿī personal law in Lebanon, in a permanent marriage, a
husband is required to pay financial maintenance for a wife for the duration of the marriage.146 It should be pointed out, however, that there is no
further obligation on the husband.147 In other words, as Human Rights
Watch has noted, Lebanon’s laws (like those of most Islamic countries)
do not “recognize a wife’s . . . non-economic contributions to the marriage, including the value of her unpaid domestic labor, or the concept of
marital property.”148
For temporary marriages, a wife has even less rights. Fadlallah’s
view is consistent with that of Sistani: “the temporary wife has no right
144. Life of Sayyed Fadlullah(ra), supra note 126.
145. See, e.g., Hanin Ghaddar, The Militarization of Sex: The Story of Hezbollah’s Halal
Hookups, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Nov. 25, 2009, 8:25 PM), https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/25/the-militarization-of-sex/.
146. FADLALLAH, supra note 134, at 319.
147. See id. At 318–20.
148. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SUBMISSION TO THE CEDAW
COMMITTEE OF LEBANON’S PERIODIC REPORT 62ND SESSION (Feb. 2015), UN Treaty Body Database, https://www.tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/LBN/INT_CED
AW_NGO_LBN_19385_E.pdf. [hereinafter HRW SUBMISSION TO CEDAW COMMITTEE]; For a
more general discussion on the differences between classical Islamic law and modern liberal perspectives regarding gender equality in marriage, see M. Mehdi Ali, Ijtihad Through the Lens of
Critical Theory, 15 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399 (2018), https://www.rutgerspolicyjournal.org/sites/jlpp/files/Ali.pdf.
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of financial maintenance.”149 However, similar to Sistani, Fadlallah requires financial maintenance of a wife if it is explicitly mentioned as a
condition of the contract.150 Nor does a temporary wife have the right to
inheritance. Again, similar to Sistani, even “if inheritance is a condition,
the condition is invalided but the contract is valid.”151
Fadlallah’s stance makes more sense when considered in the context
of a magazine article where his perspective is further elaborated:
The aim of temporary marriage is getting pleasure and not establishing a house and making a family. What should men in their twenties or
thirties do with their sexual instincts if they do not have the chance of
permanent marriage? How should we help these men? Should we recommend that they seek permanent marriage, knowing that the circumstances
do not allow them to do so?152
Given Fadlallah’s clear belief that temporary marriage is, in fact,
purely a transactional interaction, and not something that is to be used in
building an Islamic family unit, it is no surprise that financial maintenance and inheritance are not deemed necessary features of the marital
contract. The one irony here, however, is that many younger Shīʿa do not
understand that temporary marriage is designed to be purely a pleasure
marriage. Anecdotal evidence across the Shīʿī world, including in Lebanon, demonstrates that at least some individuals are using the institution
as a prelude to permanent marriage.
3. Temporary Marriages with Non-Muslims
Lebanon differs markedly from Iraq in terms of religious diversity
and pluralism. Over a dozen religious sects exist in the country.153 Unfortunately, official statistics on the latest demographic makeup of the country are not available. All that being said, it is much more likely that interfaith relationships would occur in Lebanon than in Iraq. Thus, on one
level, Fadlallah’s opining on this matter makes more sense in the broader
context of his country.

149. FADLALLAH, supra note 134 (Fatwa 1456).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Fatema Makki, Temporary Marriage from A to Z, BAYYNAT (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.english.bayynat.org/FiqhLaws/Fiqh_TemporaryMarriage.htm. Note that this article
was published after Fadlallah’s death on his official English-language website by an individual
purporting to express views that are in accordance with Fadlalah’s jurisprudence.
153. Alexander D.M. Henley, Religious Authority and Sectarianism in Lebanon, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.carnegieendowment.org
/2016/12/16/religious-authority-and-sectarianism-in-lebanon-pub-66487.
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With regard to non-Muslims, Fadlallah allows temporary marriage
with Jews and Christians,154 although he notes that “it is preferable to stay
away from marrying a woman from the People of the Book . . . because
it might impact the religious and spiritual stability of the family.”155 Zoroastrians are also prohibited as a matter of obligatory precaution.156
These views are also in line with those of Sistani.
Fadlallah’s broader rhetoric regarding the importance of temporary
marriage in mitigating the rampant sexual desires of men on the one hand,
and his role in promoting interfaith harmony on the other hand, are both
difficult to reconcile with his perspective on the permissibility of temporary marriage with Jews and Christians. It is difficult to surmise whether
some sort of social goal is being achieved here, or if Fadlallah is sticking
purely to the classical positions. One thing is clear: in other areas of the
law, Fadlallah has not been shy to deviate from accepted practices when
necessary to promote the rights of women.
4. Chastity
Unlike Sistani, the section on temporary marriage in Fadlallah’s legal manual (in fact, even the section on permanent marriage) does not
have a section discussing the importance of the chastity of a woman.
This makes sense given Fadlallah’s view discussed above, which
amounts to an acceptance and recognition of the transactional nature of
the institution of temporary marriage. It is perhaps also reflective of his
broader stance on women, in which he tends to take positions which are
considered more modern and practical.157
Nor is there a discussion regarding marrying a woman who is famous for adultery. Interestingly, Fadlallah actually pushes the envelope
when it comes to women’s sexual rights. For example, his view is that
the husband is obligated to provide sex to his wife upon demand158 – in
other words, he has made mutual a right that is usually reserved just for
men. He also has multiple sections of his website dedicated to justice in
marital relations.

154. FADLALLAH, supra note 134, at 451 (Fatwa 1324). Fadlallah does not allow this if the
person was formerly a Muslim (i.e., a murtad to Judaism or Christianity). Id.
155. Id. At 300.
156. Id.
157. See Al-Marji’ Fadl Allah, Press Release, Yajuz Al-Mara’ al-Difa’ ‘An Nafsiha Did ‘Anf
al-Rajul, , BAYYNAT (Oct. 27, 2007) (Arabic), http://www.arabic.bayynat.org.lb/NewsPage.aspx?
id=17095 (issuing a fatwa against honor killings in 2007).
158. Haq al-Zawja ‘ala Zawjha, BAYNNAT (Arabic), http://www.arabic.bayynat.org/HtmlSecondary.aspx?id=9819.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the intersection of law and state through
the lens of two prominent Shīʿī jurists in Iraq and Lebanon. In particular,
I have tried to show the ways in which Shīʿī political culture in the Middle
East is unique in its dependence on powerful religious personalities, even
if certain countries are governed in principle by democratic institutions.
The role of the jurist has been contested throughout Islamic history, but
the conflict is ever more poignant in the contemporary Shīʿī world, where
legal scholars can yield tremendous influence. Through an examination
of religious edicts regarding temporary marriage, I have shown that, despite their outsized role in governance, neither scholar feels obliged to
appease the state where there are other competing priorities, including
compelling classical jurisprudential positions. In fact, in these cases, the
jurists may ignore the requirements and laws of the state entirely, which
in itself tells us something about how the jurists conceptualize their role
within the state.
As more Iraqi governmental records become available, further research will need to be done. I often found it difficult to locate certain
legislative materials due to missing documents on the website of the Iraqi
parliament, including the decisions of the Iraqi Governing Council. The
early days of the 2003 U.S. invasion yielded a treasure trove of legal developments which need to be further explored in conjunction with Sistani’s religious edicts, a subset of which I have examined in this Article.
In Lebanon, further research needs to be done on the continuing role that
Fadlallah plays in the state, more than a decade after his death.
With all that being said, the future of Iraq and Lebanon is headed
toward an extended limbo. As Sistani continues to age, there is no clear
successor to his role. Nor has anyone emerged in Lebanon who matches
Fadlallah’s charisma. It will be interesting to see how the next generation
of jurists impact the legal and political developments of the Shīʿī Middle
East.

